The context of the 2006 presidential elections was special for several reasons. Politically the elections were unique in their composition having both the sitting president and prime minister as candidates, but also because next parliamentary elections were carried out in 2007. Parties had therefore special interest in setting up their parliamentary campaign with the nation-wide publicity of their president candidate achieved in the 2006 elections. Economically Finland faced a most successful boom since the depression of the early 1990s, and there was not yet on the horizon the world-wide depression and the national crisis of political funding, which both upset the political system of Finland since the year 2008. Political public sphere was not any more so confused by television entertainment shows or advertising. This was the third time the president was elected by the direct voting system, and voters were already familiar with political TV ads and entertainment shows, which had some kind of shock-value when appearing the first time in the Finnish public sphere in the early 1990s (see Moring & Himmelstein 1993: 6-7) . Technologically so-called social media and Web 2.0 raised their heads simultaneously with the elections and challenged the traditional forms of political communication.
Histories of convergence and intermediality
The histories of convergence and intermediality resonate with one another. Mikko Lehtonen (2000) observes that, as phenomena, convergence and intermediality are old, but as systematically developed concepts for media research, each is fairly new. Their early histories date back to the nineteenth century's techno-cultural utopias, but both convergence and intermediality raised their heads in earnest in the wake of digitalization during the 1960s and 1970s. However, as academic concepts they were not considered analytically before the 1990s. From the beginning the idea of convergence has been anchored more in technological developments than in the idea of Cottle, 1999; Mueller, 1999; Küng et al., 1999) . Milton Mueller (1999) , for example, linked convergence to the developments of integrated circuits. According to Mueller, convergence will spread hand-in-hand with the increasing speed of information-processing technology.
The great utopia of convergence has been the assumption that various communication technologies -telecommunication, broadcasting and the Internet -will merge in the future into one and the same 'super-medium' (e.g. Baldwin et al., 1996: 2-3; Küng et al., 1999: 30; Sauter, 1999: 65) . So far, however, technological development has done quite the opposite: new devices, standards and formats come up in accelerated speech, but do not necessarily communicate with each other. This race between new gadgets and technologies has characterised the late twentieth and early twentyfirst centuries' media and communication markets, whose growth has been inherently tied to the socalled technological innovations (Fagerjord and Storsul, 2007: 21-23; Fetveit, 2007: 65-66) . As consumers, we have witnessed technological divergence rather than convergence (cf. Jenkins, 2001 ). Henry Jenkins has therefore called the utopian idea that 'all media content is going to flow through a single black box into our living rooms' the 'black box fallacy' (Jenkins, 2008: 14) . This is also the reason Jenkins (2008: 15-18) talks about the 'convergence culture' or the 'cultural logic of convergence' instead of technology. As 
Media convergence is more than simply a technological shift. Convergence alters the relationship between existing technologies, industries, markets, genres, and audiences. Convergence alters the logic by which media industries operate and by which media consumers process news and entertainment. Keep this in mind: convergence refers to a process, not an endpoint.
From Jenkins' perspective convergence means 'both a change in the way media is produced and a change in the way media is consumed'. Talking about a convergence culture instead of technological convergence makes it possible to understand that 'the hardware is diverging while the The history of intermediality also dates back to the computerization of the 1960s and 1970s, but its roots are in art movements and art theories rather than in technological utopias. Dick Higgins (1938 -1998 , a member of the Fluxus group of artists, is often mentioned as a creator of the term 'intermedia' in the 1960s. For him and his fellow artists intermediality meant artistic projects in which aspects of established art and media forms were combined to create new forms. An example of this kind of intermediality was Higgins' 'visual poetry', which combines both poetry and graphic design. Higgins was well aware that there was nothing new in this kind of artistic intermediality, which basically meant anti-formalism favoured by number of artists before him, including Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Gertrude Stein and the Dadaists. (E.g. Higgins and Higgins, 2001) The term intermedia was adopted as the name of a hypertext project at Brown University in 1985, but it is not clear whether there was any connection between the project and Higgins' work.
However, a systematic conceptual analysis of intermediality dates back to the discussion on digitalization and the Internet and particularly their impact on textuality. In the early 1990s the German text theoreticians Jürgen Müller and Ernest Hess-Lüttich started developing the concept as part of hypertext theory (Hess-Lüttich, 1999: 688-689) . Through the notion of intermediality, the theory of intertextuality was expanded to apply to the analysis of new digital, Internet-based textual forms. Since then, intermediality has been a common concept in German and Scandinavian art and communication studies, and it has been especially favoured by literary scholars, musicologists and information scientists (e.g. Rajewsky, 2002; Heitmann 2003; Elleström 2010) .
Among media studies the concept of intermediality has been addressed especially by the cultural scholar Mikko Lehtonen (2000) , who refers to developments such as digitalization, the concentration of media ownership, globalisation and the orientation to synergy, as emphasising the new relevance of intermediality as an analytical category for media studies. The above processes of transformation are important because they change the cultures of production, distribution and consumption and, as a consequence, influence the intermedial construction of the media. Such an understanding of intermediality resembles that of convergence and also resonates with Jenkins' idea of convergence culture.
However, Lehtonen (2000: 11, 16 ) also anchors the intermediality approach particularly in textual analysis and defines intermediality in relation to textual theory as 'intertextuality transgressing media boundaries'. For Lehtonen, as for many users of the term, intermediality has been a political weapon against formalist purism and hence for interdisciplinary studies. Nevertheless, there is no reason to reduce intermediality merely to a dimension of intertextuality. More recently, some scholars have demonstrated that intermediality can be a productive concept if it is understood more broadly as the cultural, economic and social relationships among various media (e.g. Fornäs, 2002; Fornäs et al., 2007; Nikunen, 2007) .
Convergence, intermediality and political communication
Even if convergence has been used to describe various changes in the media and communication industries, it has emphasised technology as a key element of its explanations. Therefore, the problem in the convergence hypothesis has been that it represents a classic case of technological determinism and, accordingly, overestimates the technological aspects of digitali zation and of the new communication networks (cf. Williams, 1975: 13) . The social history of the media has proved that the historical change is far from being a linear development and not at all solely technologydriven (e.g. Williams, 1975; Winston, 1998; Briggs and Burke, 2002) . Another problem with the term convergence has been that it has often served as an industrial and political buzzword that legitimises the economic strategies of the media and communication industries and information society policies rather than being an analytical concept as such (Hassan, 2000; Sampson and Lugo, 2003; Fagerjord and Storsul, 2007) .
In this respect Jenkins' (2008) notion of a convergence culture has been a necessary enlargement of the concept and has allowed a rethinking of multimodal digital media and communication as cultural and social phenomena more than as purely technological or economic phenomena.
However, relying so heavily on fan theory, 'participatory culture' and 'collective intelligence', Jenkins perhaps puts too much weight on bottom-up, consumer-driven practices and totalizes convergence culture in a way that does not entirely coincide with the empirical reality -at least in the case of political communication. As Jenkins (2008: 220) McKinney and Rill, 2009: 402-403) . Jenkins (2008: 258) claims to be a 'critical utopian' as opposed to a 'critical pessimist', such as a leftist or Marxist scholar of political economy and critical theory. His utopia consists of 'popular democracy', in which we will 'be able to participate within the democratic process with the same ease that we have come to participate in the imaginary realms constructed through popular culture' (ibid.: 245-255) . One can argue whether democratic processes or politics should really be as easy and entertaining as popular culture, but few would disagree with Jenkins in his call for more deliberative and participatory democracy. However, highlighting utopian dimensions of converging media culture discounts those traditions, institutions, structures and practices that tend to maintain continuities in media culture and politics. In spite of the increasing number of connections among politics, popular culture and individual lifestyles as well as the growing popularity of the Internet and the social media, there are still astonishingly stubborn traditions and habits in political communication. For example, cultural forms and statuses of different media do not melt away even if the Internet creates new forms of political campaigning or allows us to participate in content production more easily than do the traditional media. In analysing political communication, we have to be sensitive to these kinds of differences and continuities, which are not clear if we talk about an overall transition to a convergence culture or a converged media system.
The concept of intermediality may help in this task. However, defining intermediality as an art form that crosses media boundaries or as a mode of intertextuality does not take us much further either. At least for an analysis of political communication, the concept of intermediality should be defined more broadly, because election campaigns and voter behaviour, for example, contain several dimensions other than the textual (cf. Fornäs, 2002: 101) . Communication can be used for different purposes, and especially in political campaigns differentiated communicative functions and interests are emphasized in a particular manner. It is therefore important to understand intermediality as a relationship among various media, in which social, technological and economic dimensions have real effects. Raymond Williams's well-known concept of 'cultural form' can be useful here. Williams (1975: 10) analyses media technologies, especially television, as particular cultural technologies whose institutions, forms and effects are constituted historically in relation to society and to the uses of these technologies. Even though the convergence theory suggests that digitalization and the Internet break down the differences between particular cultural forms, it is evident that different media still have different institutionalized forms and traditions, more or less. Contemporary political communication consists of the network of these forms rather than of some converged media culture, where all media boundaries collapse or where there is no difference between professional and grassroots content production. According to Jenkins (2008: 222) , contemporary political culture is divided into two media 'systems': that of the common culture run by the traditional mainstream media and that of the grassroots Web culture, which is more local and responds to common culture, even if these 'systems' are more and more closely linked.
I will thus define intermediality as an approach that examines the relationships between various media in a particular historical context. These relationships include economic, social and cultural forms of various media technologies. Intermediality thus offers a different kind of approach for analysing social and cultural impacts and the consequences of the technological developments in the media than does the concept of convergence, for example. The concept of intermediality pays more attention to the continuity of media forms and to the articulation and re-articulation of the media through the change of social and cultural contexts. Intermediality emphasises the analysis of continuity and the change in the media as intermedial relationships. As an empirical method, it stresses intermedial relationships between the media in particular historical contexts. Thus intermediality alerts us to the historical conjunction of media technology, economy, society and culture (see Lehtonen, 2000: 13) .
A good example of intermediality has been the historical conjunction between entertainment television and the tabloid press in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. As the most popular medium of the era, television has set the agendas and established cultural forms for a tabloid press that has tried to sell its product by using the exchange value of popular television (Herkman, 2010a) . However, digitalization and the fragmentation of television as well as the spread of the Internet have downsized the status of television in the last few years to the point that the intermedial relationship between television and the press is also challenged. The changes in the status of different media may also have devastating effects on political communication, which in many countries has been dominated by television and newspapers, but which today is increasingly reshaped by new communication networks. Yet these changes do not mean a sudden or total transition to a convergence culture. Intermediality pays therefore attention to the specific historical context in which political communication is realised, not just to the utopian potential of communication technology.
Research in political communication is usually focused on specific media forms, such as political news in the serious press and television. More entertaining genres and media forms are too often left out of such analysis, even though they have generated increasing interest among political communication scholars in the early twenty-first century (e.g. Corner and Pels, 2003; van Zoonen, 2005) . Intermediality focuses on the whole palette of political communication without resorting to homogenising it in a way that traditional political communication studies or the term convergence tend to do.
(Inter)mediatization of politics
Since the 1990s, there has been a great deal of discussion about the so-called mediatization of politics (e.g. Asp, 1990; Mancini and Swanson, 1994; Scammel, 1995; Mazzoleni and Schulz, 1999) . The mediatization of politics has involved at least three factors in the relationship between media and politics: the increased significance of media publicity for politics, the increased professionalism of political communication and the increased personalisation of politics. According to the mediatization theory, these changes have forced political agencies to rethink their actions through the media insofar as the logic of today's politics is determined by the so-called 'media logic', which has also increased the significance of professionalism in communication.
However, there is no simple truth about the different forms of mediatization (Kunelius et al., 2009: 48-75) . It is possible, for example, that the mediatization thesis is too often taken as a matter-ofcourse, whereas political institutions are not at all as mediatized as they are assumed to be.
Paradoxically, political decision-making processes may become more hidden with the increasing number of political media performances and scandals (Herkman, 2009: 86) . Thus, there are several levels in mediatization, and it is an open question as to which serve as the key elements (see Strömbäck, 2008 ). Yet what is clear is that almost all citizens depend on media content for information about politics and politicians, both during elections and at other times. And since the Mediatization has taken place at the same time as political agencies, such as political parties, have assigned their power to market forces, political ideologies have converged on multiparty systems and voter volatility and political cynicism have increased. Bernard Manin (1997: 218-237 ) has described these changes as a transition from 'party democracy to audience democracy', whereby the ideological differences between parties have become obscure, and parties and politicians have turned into agents whose decisions are often based more on pragmatism than on ideology. Such technocratic and bureaucratic politicians are known and judged by their media performances. In 'audience democracy' the significance of the party has diminished, while the significance of the individual politician and his or her persona has increased.
It is clear that focusing on the candidate as a public figure emphasises the variations in media publicity, since different genres and media forms construct different kinds of publicity. This is true especially in Finnish presidential elections campaigns because votes are given directly to individual candidates who compete against each other. Even if in the 'postmodern public sphere' the differences between high and low or serious and entertaining have diminished (e.g. Hartley, 1996: 155-157) and increasingly there is a 'middlebrow' culture between (Gripsrud, 2000: 291) , it is still easy to distinguish serious election discussions, for example, from entertainment shows in television programming. These different genres also stress different dimensions of the candidates' personae and have distinct 'functions' in campaigns and election publicity (Herkman, 2008a: 11) .
The Finnish media system has also changed towards more commercial and tabloidized form. Even though Finland can be called as one of the 'democratic-corporatist' countries, as Daniel C. Hallin and Paolo Mancini (2004) have put it in their prominent comparison of European and NorthAmerican media systems, similarly than in many other West European countries, the relative status of public service broadcasting has diminished, political press declined and commercial entertainment media strengthened its market share in Finland since the late 1980s. The structural transformation of the Finnish media system has meant a transition from partisan to commercial media and the increased de-regulation and re-regulation of media markets, changes that can be described as the overall marketization of the Finnish media (Herkman, 2009) . As a result politicians and campaign teams as well as their 'audiences' (i.e. voters) are today more aware of the various roles and the status of different media in political campaigns. This highlights the significance of intermediality in political communication.
Intermediality and political campaigns
Thematic interviews conducted after the Finnish presidential elections in 2006 demonstrated that the campaign staff was highly aware of the intermedial dimensions of the campaign. Immediately after the elections I discussed the role of various media forms and genres in the 2006 election campaigns with fourteen interviewees. They included three candidates (from a total of eight), five campaign managers and six media personnel from the key media corporations and productions during the campaign. As a whole, the interviewees' perspective on the intermedial relationships between different media was amazingly consistent. For that reason the role of the various media in the campaigns as represented in the thematic interviews can be summarised as follows (see table 1): The interviewees in general, and especially those who worked in television, stressed that television is a medium for show business: it accentuates a candidate's external features, favours short statements -'one-liners' -and requires immediate reaction. Therefore, television performances promote certain types of politicians. Radio, by contrast, enables more profound discussions and longer statements and does not highlight the external features of a candidate. The power of television is its high publicity value. One interviewee even called society today a 'television society', even though he admits to the increasing significance of the Internet. Yet one interviewee predicted that 'television will certainly roll on in the next decade of political communication', even if multimedia platforms will increase in popularity.
However, the interviewees also stressed the meaning of the genre or platform at least as much as the significance of the media themselves. The Internet as a medium, for example, was inherently linked to direct interaction between candidates and voters, but the forms of interaction were seen completely differently in the case of candidates' blogs, party web-pages, candidate selectors, media company web-pages or debates in social media forums. The official web-pages of parties, campaigns and media companies were seen as continuations of more traditional forms of election publicity and political marketing, whereas candidate selectors, blogs and discussion forums were thought to realise the idea of interactivity and voter participation.
The content analysis of press publicity also supported the differences between genres and media forms. In order to compare different forms and genres to each other the data included material from serious and popular newspapers, periodicals and magazines. It became clear that the sample journals covered the elections strictly within the framework of their audience segments and did not seriously try to cross the media boundaries (Herkman, 2010b: 15-17) . There seemed to be a kind of mutual understanding among the various media about their roles in political publicity and the media sphere in general, and this understanding was determined by the commercial logic of audience segmentation. Corporate intermediality was defined by media markets, whereby media companies try to find cross-media synergies and simultaneously differentiate various media from each other (cf. Croteau and Hoynes, 2001: 116-120) . Thus, media companies are keen to construct differentiated media identities or brands for purposes of marketing, even if at the corporate level they rely on organisational and technological convergence (Fetveit, 2007: 65) . Carlson, 2007) . The real effect of the blogs was more in the attention they awakened in traditional news media. Thus, the most important aspect of the blogs was that they served the candidates as a forum for setting agendas without 'journalistic filtering' (ibid.: 62), but their effectiveness was still connected to their intermedial relationship or 'remediation' to more traditional political journalism (cf. Bolter and Grusin, 2000) .
Even though an empirical analysis of candidate blogs has shown that their contents were focused mostly on the campaigns and political questions (Carlson, 2007: 68-69) According to the theme interviews, intermediality was recognised in campaign teams, but fixed schedules and old habits pushed the media strategies towards traditional forms of political communication. Especially the programming schedules of the most well-established television channels significantly defined the schedules of campaign teams. Politicians themselves seemed to be conservative rather than innovative in their views of the various media. A large-scale survey of the Finnish establishment supports this result: politicians and executives followed and appreciated the most traditional and prestigious media, such as the leading newspaper of a country and the largest national television channels (Kunelius et al., 2009: 266-269) . Blogs were taken up in the 2006 campaigns more as trendy aftermaths of international (American) experiences than as forums for genuine dialogue with voters. Election debates televised on the main national channels were judged to be the most important forms of publicity, while the significance of political advertising and news were also highly rated. Intermediality as the systematic strategic foundation of political campaigns was understood quite traditionally, and the idea of a convergence culture was not fully realised in the campaign perspectives.
Intermediality and voting behaviour
Right after the first and second rounds of the 2006 presidential elections, TNS Gallup Finland carried out surveys of 1,049 voters (Moring and Gallup Finland, 2006) . The sample was a demographic representation of Finnish voters. According to the survey, television was still the most important medium in the 2006 elections; traditional and serious forms of publicity -news and television discussions -were thought by all age groups to be the most important sources of information during the elections and campaigns. However, there seemed to be a clear divide between voter generations and their relationship to sources of information: whereas television was popular among all age groups, newspapers and radio were emphasised especially by older voters, while the Internet was emphasised by younger voters. Younger age groups were also proportionally more interested in entertainment genres than were older people.
A similar divide between generations can be found in the motives behind voting decisions. The older voters were in general more 'critical' and rationalised their voting decisions with traditional political arguments about foreign and domestic politics as well as by a candidate's party connections. Younger voters put proportionally more emphasis on a candidate's characteristics and his or her ability to win the elections. However, an equally important motif in all age groups was the candidate's characteristics, which more than half of all voters considered important.
At least two conclusions can be drawn from by the survey responses. First, the survey results support the general view that the traditional political media genres and forms still dominate election campaigning. However, the results also suggest that this view might be problematic from the perspective of voter generations. Younger voters showed so much interest in network communication and in non-traditional forms of election publicity that the role of these media forms in the intermedial whole of political communication should be seriously reconsidered.
Second, it is evident that the different forms of publicity and a variety of media were important factors in creating a pluralistic and diverse public sphere in the elections, but older voter groups seemed to stress especially the intermedial relationships among television, newspapers and radio, whereas younger voter groups were more interested in the connections between television and the and Barack Obama's campaign that the possibilities for the social media in political communication became evident internationally (cf. Kaid, 2009; McKinney and Rill, 2009; Spaeth, 2009 However, the traditions and institutions in local political cultures and media systems prevent the total 'Americanization' of political communication, which is always customised for a particular context (Isotalus, 2001: 11-13; Nord, 2007: 91-92) . There is still, for example, a clear difference between the West European and the US campaign organisations; the former rely more on traditional party organisations, whereas the latter rely on a looser network of political consultants and other communication professionals (Farrell et al., 2010: 23-26) . The regulation of campaign financing and political communication may also set limits on the professionalization of political communication in some European countries. For example, political television marketing is even today prohibited in Sweden (Nord, 2007: 84) . In Finland political television advertisements and candidate performances in entertainment shows during the campaigns have been permitted since the early 1990s, which has made these cultural forms so familiar to Finnish voters that there was no longer even any reliance on their significance in the 2006 elections (Herkman, 2008b: 94) . Instead, the first ever televised live debate between the leaders of the main parties was aired during the general election of 2010 in the United Kingdom, which highlighted this debate in public discussions. In Finland the public debate on unclear campaign funding and connections between financiers and politicians was raised in 2008 and led to national political crisis and to renewal of the election legislation. These kinds of contextual elements are fundamental determinants of political communication, and they also direct intermedial relationships in a particular way.
It is possible that the convergence culture has had a more fundamental influence on political communication in the US than in the European context, which would at least partly explain the disparity between Jenkins' utopianism and the North European criticism of convergence (cf.
Charles, 2009). Barack Obama's success, for example, has been explained by his rhetoric which enables more interactive and communicative politics than pure audience democratic practices (Bang, 2009 ), but Obama has also been thought to demonstrate late-modern 'liquid celebrity' (Redmond, 2010) Nevertheless, in many democracies there seems to be a divide between voter and media generations -a divide that also implies a legitimacy crisis both in the political system itself and in the political Finland, for example, -unlike in the US elections -concentrated on candidates' own statements with no interactive dialogue with their readers (Carlson, 2007: 72) . In using this approach 
